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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN TH~~ MATTER OF THE ES- ! 
TATE OF WILLIAM PAXMAN, 
Deceased. 
Case 
No.10565 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATE TAX CO·MMISSION 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Fifth Judi-
cial District Court, Honorable C. Nelson Day, Judge. 
The question which appellant State Tax Commission 
presents to the Court for review is whether or not the 
decedent, William Paxman, in his will dated May 23, 
1944, designated the testamentary provisions therein in 
favor of his wife, Vivian T. Paxman, to be in addition to 
the distributive share of his interests in legal and equi-
table estates created in her by Section 74-4-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, or whether she must take either under 
the will or the statute, as Section 74-4-4, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, specifically provides where it does not 
appear clearly in the will that its provisions are meant 
to be in addition to the statutory share. 
In addition to the above issue, this appeal presents 
a qnPstion, raised by the executrix on cross-appeal, as to 
1 
the rate of inheritance tax to be imposed upon the tax-
able estate pursuant to Section 59-12-2, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court, on October 4, 1965, pursuant to a 
petition (R. 13-15) filed by the executrix for the estate, 
heard oral argument in support of and in opposition to 
the widow's claim to be entitled to both her distributive 
share created by Section 74-4-3, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, and the bequest in her husband's will, which is set 
forth completely in the statement of facts. A :Memoran-
dum Decision (R. 19a) and Order (R. 16-17) ruling for 
the executrix were issued. Subsequently, the court con-
sidered argument on the second question involved in this 
appeal - the proper rates imposed upon the taxable 
estate. A second Memorandum Decision (R. 24) fol-
lowed in connection therewith and finally, on January 
20, 1966, a Final Order (R. 29-30), with accompanying 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 25-28), and 
an Order amending the previous Order approving the in-
heritance tax return and fixing inheritance tax (R. 31-32), 
·were promulgated by the lower court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This appeal is from the final Order (R. 29-30), and 
specifically from the first three numbered paragraphs of 
the Order, and those parts of the other documents bear-
ing the same date issued simultaneously therewith, which 
reflect the same conclusions set forth in these three num-
bered paragraphs: 
2 
1. That the testator, William Paxman, intended to 
and did provide by his will that his wife, if she sur-
vived him, have all of his estate, and without re-
quiring her to relinquish her statutory right to 
one-third of the real estate, and that such intention 
appears from the will of the deceased. 
2. That the surviving wife of said testator had 
the right to claim, and receive under the provisions 
of Sec. 7 4-4-3 Utah Code 1953 one-third of real es-
tate described in the Inheritance Tax Return on 
file herein, without renouncing the will of said de-
ceased, and also had the right to receive all other 
property left by said deceased without relinquish-
ing her right under said statute to claim one-third 
of the real estate ref erred to. 
3. That the Inheritance Tax Return filed herein 
by the executrix of said estate is correct and 
should be approved and the exclusion from the 
taxable estate in the amount of $12,306.66 claimed 
in said return on account of the widow's statutory 
one-third interest in real estate should be allowed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 23, 1944, William Paxman, a resident of Juab 
County, State of Utah, published his last will and testa-
ment. Since this document is very concise, and its exact 
wording extremely significant, that document is here set 
forth in full: 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That I, William Paxman, a resident of Nephi, 
.Juab County, State of Utah, over the age of twen-
ty-one years and of sound and disposing mind and 
memory, and not acting under duress, menace, 
3 
fraud or undue influence of any person whomso. 
ever, and hereby expressly revoking all other and 
former wills made by me, do make, publish and 
declare this my la.st will and testament, as follows, 
to-wit: 
1. I hereby give, devise and bequeath unto my 
beloved wife, Vivian T. Paxman, all my propert;-
and estate, both real and personal, of whatsoever 
nature or wheresoever situated, to haYe and to 
hold the same absolutely. 
2. I hereby nominate and appoint my beloved 
wife, Vivian T. Paxman, the executrix of this my 
last will and testament, and direct that she serve 
as such executrix without bond. 
3. I hereby declare that my omission to pro-
vide herein for my children is intentional and 
not occasioned by any accident or mistake, and it 
is my desire and will that my children now liYing 
and also any of my children which may be born 
hereafter shall not share in my estate. 
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I ha,·e here-
unto set my hand this 23rd day of May, A.D., 1944. 
/s/ William Paxman 
The foregoing instrument, consisting of thi~ 
one page only, was, at the date thereof, by said 
William Paxman, signed, sealed and published as 
and declared to be his last will and testament, in 
the presence of us, who, at his request and in his 
presence and in the presence of each other, have 
signed our names as subscribing witnesses thereto. 
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/s/ Bertha Mc Pherson 
Resident: Nephi, Utah 
/s/ Joel Taylor 
Resident: Xephi, rtah 
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On November 20, 1964, William Paxman died. No subse-
quent will or codicil modified the instrument above set 
forth. 
After the death of the testator, executrix for the 
c•state, Vivian T. Paxman, filed a document entitled Ac-
ceptance of Testamentary Provisions (R. 4) by which 
she purported to claim under the statutory provisions 
herein involved in the following language: 
The undersigned surviving wife of William 
Paxman, deceased, hereby accepts the provisions 
of the will of said deceased, but without relin-
quishment of her right as surviving wife to one-
third of all real estate left by said deceased, under 
the provisions of Section 74-4-3, Utah Code Ailn.o-
tated, 1953. 
The undersigned hereby claims under both the 
statute and the will, and contends that it was the 
intention of said William Paxman, by his will, to 
bequeath and devise to her all of his estate, and 
without depriving her of her statutory right to 
one-third of his real estate in case she survived 
him. 
On September 22, 1965, another unusual document 
was filed by the executrix for the estate, entitled Peti-
tion for Order Approving Inheritance Tax Return and 
Fixing Inheritance Tax (R. 13-15). The provision of this 
document out of the ordinary was that part thereof pe-
titioning the District Court to pass on the accuracy and 
propriety of the inheritance tax return which had been 
filed by the executrix with the State Tax Commission, 
without giving the Commission the preliminary right to 
5 
make an initial determination of the appropriateness of 
such a return on the basis of its experience and expertise 
in this area. Counsel for the Tax Commission in hi~ 
appearance on October 4, 1965, submitted to the court 
that petitioner-executrix had failed to exhaust her ad. 
mmistrative remedies and that a Commission review 
prior to the court's assuming jurisdiction would he in tlH· 
best interests of all. 
The court, however, determined to take primary 
jurisdiction of the case and decided the case upon ifa 
merits, which would appear to be within its authority 
under the provisions of Section 59-12-35, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, even though it is at variance with the ad-
ministrative pattern of judicial review subsequent to 
Commission determination usually adhered to in state 
tax cases. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER APPROPRIATE UTAH LA \V, A 
WIFE MUST CHOOSE TO TAKE EITHER 
HER STATUTORY DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE 
UNDER SECTION 74-4-3, UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953, OR TO TAKE UNDER THE 
TERMS OF HER HUSBAND'S WILL, UN-
LESS THE HUSBAND EXPRESSLY PRO-
VIDES IN HIS WILL THAT SHE MAY CLAIM 
BOTH. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A 
CLEAR PROVISION IN THE WILL, THE 
ELECTION BY THE WIFE OF ONE IS A 
REPUDIATION OF THE OTHER. 
Section 7 4-4-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, crca tes 
an interest in a wife in her own right in real property 
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nwne<l hy her husband during the marriage m follow-
ing term~: 
One-third in value of all the legal or equitable 
estates in real propert>T possessed by the husband 
at any time during the marriage, to which the wife 
has made no relinquishment of her rights, shall be 
set apart as her property in fee simple, if she sur-
viYes him; provided, that the wife shall not be en-
titled to any interest under the provisions of this 
section in any such estate of which the husband 
has made a conYeyance when the wife, at the time 
0f the conveyance, was not and never had been a 
resident of the territory or state of Utah. Prop-
erty distributed under the provisions secured by 
liens for work or labor done or material furnished 
exclusively for the improvement of the same, and 
except those created for the purchase thereof, and 
for taxes levied thereon. The value of such part 
of the homestead as may be set aside to the widow 
shall be deducted from the distributive share pro-
Yided for her in this section. In cases wherein 
only th0 heirs, deYisees and legatees of the de-
cedent are interested, the property secured to the 
widow by this section may be set off by the court 
in due process of administration. 
This statute is a substitution for common law dower, 
which has been expressly abolished in this jurisdiction 
(Section 74-4-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). 
This problem of whether or not inheritance taxes 
apply to dower or comparable statutory property inter-
ests receiv<'d by a wife upon the death of her husband has 
been of concern in many jurisdictions in this country, 
although litigation in the area has been much less exten-
siye than might be imagined. The explanation for this 
7 
phenomena lies in the history of inheritance taxation in 
the United States. 
The first American inheritance tax law was enacted 
by the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1826, but the tax was 
exacted from collateral heirs only, and not the decedent's 
direct family. It was not until 1891, in the State of New 
York, that an inheritance tax was imposed upon an estatr 
or part thereof transmitted to a spouse or child of 
the decedent. By 1920, however, this practice was com-
mon in virtually every American jurisdiction. Until 
1948, the federal inheritance tax law contained provisions 
which indirectly benefited an estate when dower or a 
comparable statutory interest was not claimed. The 
marital deduction, added to the federal tax law in 1948, 
terminated this particular benefit, and questions concern-
ing taxation of property passing under statutes such as 
ours began to be presented to courts for decision. 
In the majority of jurisdictions, including Utah, it 
is deemed that a dower type interest, whether common 
law or statutory, should not be subjected to an inheri-
tance tax because it doesn't pass from the husband to 
the wife at his death but is created in the wife, albeit 
inchoate, at the time the property is obtained or at the 
time of the marriage, whichever occurs last. In Re 
Bullen's Estate, 47 Utah 96, 151 Pac. 533 (1915). Thus 
neither an inheritance tax, which is a tax upon the right of 
receipt by an heir, devisee, or legatee of property, nor au 
estate tax, which is a tax upon the right of transfer of 
property from the decedent, will lie in these jurisdictions. 
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The Utah tax is, despite its nomenclature, an estate tax 
with some inheritance tax aspects. State Taa; Commission 
'" Hackman, 88 Utah 424, 55 P. 2d 171 (1936); Walker 
Hank & Trust Co. v. State Tax Commission, 100 Utah 307, 
114 P. 2d 1030 (1941). 
A minority of jurisdictions, however, have taken a 
C'ontrary position and imposed a tax upon a dower inter-
est under varying legal and equitable theories. To im-
pose such a tax is not unconstitutional as a violation of 
due process of law. State v. Boney, 156 Ark. 169, 245 
s.w. 315 (1922).• 
Most authorities seem to feel that equity and the pub-
lie interest are served by giving tax benefits in case of 
transmission to wife and children, but some suggest that 
inequities can arise where a wife may choose between her 
statutory interest and a legacy in her husband's will. 
Particularly is this true where, as in our jurisdiction, 
the husband may designate in his will that the wife may 
take both her statutory distributive share and the legacy 
he provides for her. This may create a situation where 
two wives, equally loved and cared for by their husbands, 
might receive through his will the same amount of prop-
erty, with one getting a substantial tax break over the 
other simply because one husband had better legal advice 
than the other, and inserted in his will a statement to the 
*For a comprehensive and particularly helpful survey of the his-
tory of state inheritance taxation of dower and similar interests, 
and of the practices of the various states in relation thereto, see 
Note, "Inheritance Taxation of Dower and Other Marital Inter-
ests," 99 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 979 (1951). 
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effect that its provisions ·were in addition to the statutory 
share under Section 7 4-4-3. 
Even though our statutes make this possible it would 
appear to be in the best interests of equity and fairness 
in tax administration to limit this to instances where thiR 
designation is clearly and unambiguously set forth ill 
the will. The provision making possible election by the 
widow of either her statutory share or her bequest under 
her husband's will is Section 74-4-4, Utah Code Annotat-
ed, 1953, which reads as follo-ws: 
If the husband shall make any provision by will 
for the widow, such provision shall be deemed to 
be in lieu of the distributive share secured by the 
next preceding section, unless it shall appear 
from the will that the decedent designed the testa-
mentary provisions to be additional to such dis-
tributive share, in which case the widow shall be 
presumed to have accepted both such testamentary 
provisions and such distributive share. If, how-
ever, it does not appear from the will that its 
provision for the widow is additional, then the 
widow shall be conclusively presumed to have re-
nounced such provision and to have accepted her 
distributive share, unless within four months 
after the admission of the will to pro bate, or with-
in such additional time before distribution as the 
court may allow, she shall, by written instrument 
filed with the clerk of the court, accept the testa-
mentary provision, which acceptance shall he 
construed to be a renunciation of her distributive 
share. In the event that the wife shall be insane 
or incompetent, or absent from the state, an elec-
tion shall be made for her by a general guardian. 
if she has one, or by a special guardian for the pur-
pose appointed by the court. 
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It should be pointed out that the executrix for the 
e,;tate in the instant case is seeking not simply the benefit 
of au exclusion of her distributive share from the gross 
<':,tnte, hut rather claiming both under the statute and 
11rnlN the terms of her husband's will. It is respectfully 
submitterl that in the instant frame of reference such a 
lienefit is i;wt available to her. 
Under the statutory provisions above set forth, the 
l111sba11J may designate in his will that the widow take 
both her legacy and her distributive share. If, however, 
the husband does not clearly manifest this intent and 
stnte ''that its provision for the widow is additional 
(to the distributive share), then the widow shall be con-
ehrnively presumed to have renounced such provision 
arnl to have accepted her distributive share," unless v;ith-
i11 four months after the will is admitted to probate, she, 
hy written instrument filed with the clerk of the court, 
accepts the testamentary provision "which acceptance 
shall he construed to be a renunciation of her distributive 
share." 
Thus, unless the husband makes the specific and un-
ambiguous designation in his \vill, made mandatory by 
the statute, the a.cceptance under the 'will is a rejection 
of the distributive share, and an acceptance of the dis-
trilndire share is a renunciation of the will. The choice 
is either/or; a widow cannot "choose" both. 
We respectfully submit that this is not a question of 
first impression, but that this court has consistently in 
11 
the past held that the widow is entitled to take either 
under the terms of the will or under the statute, but not 
both, unless the appropriate language is found in her 
husband's will. In Re Osgood's Estate, 52Utah185, 173 
Pac. 152 (1918), involved a fact situation similar to the 
problem before the court, differing only in that the pro-
visions of the will were much more complicated, and in 
the testator's express wish that an election he made. ThP 
following language from this case is instructive: 
In case, however, the husband makes provision 
in his will for his wife, she may then waive or 
surrender her rights under section 2826 [74-4-31, 
and take under her husband's will. That she may 
do that is just as clear from section 2827 [74-4-4], 
which we have quoted in full, as it is clear from 
section 2826 [74-4-3], that she is entitled to one-
third of the value of her husband's real property 
regardless of any provision he may make for her 
in his will. If, however, the husband makes pro-
vision in his will for his widow, and she elects to 
waive or to relinquish her right under section 2826 
[74-4-3], supra, and elects to take under the will, 
she then assumes precisely the same relation to 
the husband's estate as any other legatee or devi-
see under the will. In that event she relinquishes 
the right given to her by section 2826 [74-4-3] 
just as effectually as though she had conveyed 
such right by deed either before or after the death 
of her husband. Such is clearly the purport and 
effect of sections 2826 [74-4-3] and 2827 [74-4-4] 
when read and construed together, as they must 
be. In case, therefore, the widow elects to take 
under her husband's will, as provided by section 
2827 [7 4-4-4], she, of necessity, relinquishes her 
right to take under section 2826 [74-4-3], and thus 
whatever share she receives from her husband's 
12 
estate under the will passes to her by such will 
and not otherwise. In such event the amount that 
she receives from her husband's estate, whatever 
it may be, may not be deducted from her hus-
band's estate in computing the inheritance tax ... 
52 Utah 193-194. (Emphasis added.) 
'L'he court also noted the following: 
... That court [New York] has held that when 
the widow takes under the husband's will the 
whole estate is subject to inheritance tax with-
out any deductions except those specifically pro-
vided for by statute. To the mind of the writer 
no other conclusion is permissible under the pres-
ent wording of our statute. 52 Utah 200. 
An earlier case, In Re Little's Estate, 22 Utah 204, 61 P. 
899 (1900), came to the same conclusions. 
A more recent case, In Re Kohn's Estate, 56 Utah 
17. 187 Pac. 409 (1920), appears to this writer to be con-
trnlling, inasmuch as it cannot be distinguished factually. 
1'he testator left five dollars to each of his five children 
and the residue and remainder of his estate to his wife. 
The court said this, in effect, was a giving of his entire 
estate to his wife and that the provisions relating to his 
<'hildren were made only to prevent any possible con-
troversy which might arise from omitting his offspring. 
The court said, "We must assume that the father was 
familiar with our statute relating to wills," and denied 
to the estate an exclusion similar to the one Mrs. Paxman 
is here seeking, holding: 
The statute is clear and explicit. If the hus-
band makes any provision in his will for his 
widow, the presumption arises that the provision 
so made is in lieu of and not in addition to her 
13 
statutory share, and this presumption prevails 
unless it appears from the will itself that the prn-
vision was intended to be in addition to h01' statu-
tory share. 
In both his memorandum and his argument in the lower 
court, counsel for the estate relied heavily upon In Re 
Bullen's Estate, supra. This case simply stands for the 
proposition that Section 7 4-4-3 creates an independent 
property interest in the wife of which she cannot lie dc\-
prived without her consent. This proposition is not di~'­
puted; however, her decision to take under her husbarnl' ~ 
will is lier consent, is in fact a voluntary rclinq11isl1me11t 
of her statutory right. Unless the husband clearly desig-
nates that his legacy to her is in addition to and separa1e 
from her statutory share, she must abandon her dower 
interest to take under the will. This is true whether sl10 
is sole heir, whether she inherits with her children, or 
whether she is merely one of a number of heirs of diff('l' 
ent classes. Had l\frs. Paxman chose to renounce the l'.ill 
in this case some of the property in the estate -would ha\'e 
gone to the disinherited children under intestate succc:-;-
sion laws. By claiming under the ·will she gets all of tlw 
property, which is consistent with her husband's mani-
fest intent. By claiming to take both under the will aml 
by the statute she claims exactly the same property -
only the inheritance tax ramifications vary. 
The Tax Commission has in the past taken the posi-
tion, consistent with the cases cited above, that unless 
the husband-decedent's will clearly designates to tltt' 
contrary, an election by the widow to take either l1e 1 
14 
statutory interest or the legacy under the will is required. 
If 1lte widow chooses to take under the ·will, she wai\·es 
lier c;tatutory real property interest and such property 
is i11clrnlable in the taxable estate. This represents a 
<·011tcmporaneons and continuing practical interpretation 
lly the Tax Commission, the agency specifically charged 
h;- law with enforcement and administration of our rcv-
rnnc laws. (Section 52-5-46, Utah Code Annotated, 
195:)). This interpretation should not be ovcrturne(l 
nnless clearly erroneous. 
The practice and interpretive regulations by 
officers, administrative agencies, departmental 
heads and others officially charged with the duty 
of administering and enforcing a statute will carry 
great weight in determining the operation of a 
statute. 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction., 516. 
See also JVestern Leather & Finding Co. v. State 
Taa; Commission, 87 Utah 227, 48 P. 2d 526 (1935) . 
. . . The use of contemporary and practical in-
terpretation makes for certainty in the law and 
justifies reliance upon the conduct of public offi-
cials. 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 513. 
rrax practitioners and members of the general public 
have come to know and rely upon the Commission's pol-
ie;· and practice in this area for many years, have not 
challenged the same, and ''like all precedents, where 
eontomporaneous and practical interpretation has stood 
nnehallcnged for a considerable length of time, it will 
hP 1·egarded as of great importance iu arriving at the 
proper construction of a statute." 2 Sutherland, Stafu-
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tory Construction, 529-521. See also Shockley v. Ab-
bott Supply Co., 50 Del. 510, 135 A. 2d 607 (1957); Dixie 
Coaches v. Ramsden, 238 Ala. 285, 190 So. 92 (1939): 
Murray Hospital v. Angrove, 92 Mont. 101, 10 P. 2d 577 
(1932). Also worthy of note is the fact that the Utah Leg-
islature has acquiesced in this interpretation. Had this 
body thought the Commission's interpretation inequitable 
or inconsistent with the intent of Sections 7 4-4-3 and 
74-4-4, it would have been an easy matter for it to have 
amended the law to require an adjustment of Commis-
sion practice. This has not been done, and this legisla-
tive acquiescence is implied approval of the Commission's 
interpretation and administration. Coudi v. Independent 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 302 P. 2d 117 (Okla. 1956); 
State v. Yelle, 52 Wash. 2d 158, 324 P. 2d 247 (1951). 
The transmission and inheritance of property is re-
garded in our Anglo-American legal tradition to be a 
privilege and not a right. The sovereign has control over 
such property transfers, and can regulate them in just 
about any manner deemed in the best interests of the 
state and its citizens. The same rules of construction 
and interpretation usually applicable to revenue and 
taxation laws apply also to inheritance tax laws, including 
the rule of strict construction of exemptions in favor of 
the taxing power and against the taxpayer. English v. 
Crcnsha.w, 120 Tenn. 531, 110 S.W. 211, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
753 (1908). 
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This proposition of law is accepted in virtually every 
American jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court 
}1as spoken as follows in relation thereto: 
When exemption is claimed, it must be shown 
indubitably to exist. At the outset every presump-
tion is against it. A well-founded doubt is fatal 
to the claim. It is only when the claims of the 
concession are too explicit to admit fairly of any 
other construction that the proposition can be sup-
ported. Farrington v. Temiessee, 95 U.S. 679, 24 
L. Ed. 558, 560 (1878). 
Two leading cases standing for this proposition are 
Utah cases. The first, Judge v. Spencer, dealing with 
property tax, was decided in 1897. The decision con-
~ained the following language : 
... the court will not aid or enlarge exemptions 
by interpretation. The presumption is that all ex-
emptions intended to be granted were granted in 
express terms. In such cases the rule of strict 
construction applies, and, in order to relieve 
any species of property from its due and just pro-
portion of the burdens of the government, the 
language relied on, as creating the exemption, 
should be so clear as not to admit of reasonable 
controversy about its meaning, for all doubts must 
be resolved against the exemption. The power to 
tax rests upon necessity, and is essential to the 
state. Judge v. Spencer, 15 Utah 242, 249; 48 Pac. 
1097, 1099-1100 (1897). 
In Stillman v. Lynch, 56 Utah 540, 547, 192 Pac. 272, 
275; 12 A.L.R 552, 556 (1920), the court held as follows: 
If as to exemption there is doubt, that doubt 
will be resolved in favor of taxation. It has been 
said taxation is the rule, exemption the exception. 
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A leading text authority articulates the concept 111 thi" 
fashion: 
As a. general rule, grants of tax exemptions arr 
giYen a rigid interpretation against the asser-
tions of the taxpayer and in fayor of the taxing 
power. The basis for the rule here is the samr 
as that supporting a rule of strict constrnctio11 
of positive revenue laws - that the burden of 
taxation should be distributed equally and fairly 
among the members of society. 3 Sutherland, 
Statutory Construction, Sec. 6702. 
See also 2 Cooley, Taxation, Sec. 672 (4th ed. 1924). 
Thus, the executrix for the estate has the burden to 
show that she is entitled to exemption in this case. This 
seems particularly fair since, as earlier pointed ont, 
there is an inherent inequity in the statute, which per-
mits one party to get a tax benefit another party in a like 
situation is denied merely because of sounder and more 
perceptive legal advice. The court should not extend this 
inequity by permitting the double exemption to be claimed 
in the type of situation here present. 
It might be argued in rebuttal to the foregoing that 
the Legislature has manifested an intent and a desire to 
benefit widows and children of decedents, and a liberal 
rather than a strict interpretation here would best further 
this legislatiYe policy. The answer to this is that 
the grant of the double benefit would require not just a 
liberal interpretation but an unwarranted distortion of 
the statute. Further, Mrs. Paxman is benefitting sub-
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stautially because she is a surviving widow rather than a 
stranger to the blood, even without the relief she is here 
seeking. As noted in Point III, she received the full 
$40,000 exemption provided for widows and surviving 
children. Also, she received a joint tenancy exclusion, 
another legislative boon granted only to surviving family 
members, in the amount of $23,450.88. Thus, the fact 
that slie is the widow of the testator instead of some-
one not related has created in her favor a totally tax-
frre bequest of over $63,000, completely independent of 
this problem. The public policy behind dower - the pro-
tection of a widow against a thankless, arbitrary husband 
- has been well served. 
It is thus submitted that it is necessary for a will 
to clearly and unequivocally state that its provisions in 
favor of a surviving widow are in addition to the interest 
ere a ted in her by Section 7 4-4-3 and Section 7 4-4-4 if she 
is to get the benefit of both the legacy and the statutory 
distributive share, and that this requirement is fair and 
equitable, both generally and in this particular factual 
context. Any doubt or ambiguity should be resolved in 
favor of the taxing power and against the taxpayer seek-
iug exemption. 
POINT II 
THE LANGUAGE IN THE PARTICULAR 
vVILL HEREIN INVOLVED DOES NOT PRO-
\TIDE THAT ITS TESTAMENTARY GRANT 
TO l\IRS. PAXMAN IS TO BE CONSIDERED 
_ADDITIONAL TO THE \VIFE'S DISTRIBU-
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TIVE SHARE CREATED IN HER BY SEC-
TION 74-4-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
The first point in this brief examined the standard 
under which a wife might claim both her statutory dis-
tributive share and the bequest left her in her husband's 
will. It was therein concluded, and respectfully suggest-
ed to the court, that the only time this is possible is when 
the will of the decedent husband clearly and without am-
biguity designates that the wife is to take her legacy in 
addition to her statutory interest. Point II is correla-
tive, and the problem with which it deals is whether or 
not the last will and testament executed by William Pax-
man on May 23, 1944, meets this statutory test. It is sub-
mitted that it does not. 
The provision in Mr. Paxman's will which provides 
for his wife is numbered paragraph 1, and reads as 
follows: 
1. I hereby give, devise and bequeath unto 
my beloved wife, Vivian T. Paxman, all my prop-
erty and estate, both real and personal, of what-
ever nature or wheresoever situated, to have and 
to hold the same absolutely. 
Other provisions of the will appoint his wife to be execu-
trix and set forth his intention to disinherit his chil-
dren. These have no relevance to the instant question. 
On the sole basis of the wording above quoted, it 
was urged that William Paxman intended that his grant 
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to his wife be in addition to her distributive share pro-
,·i<led for in Section 74-4-3. No evidence other than this 
will was proffered to support this contention. Indeed, 
had there been an offer of such evidence, it would have 
h(•eu inadmissible since the statute requires that the in-
tent of the testator be apparent in the will itself. 
An examination of the language of the will reveals 
110 reference, explicit or implied, to Section 74-4-3 or any 
other statute, no reference, explicit or implied, to any 
concept that her bequest should be in addition to any 
other interest the wife might have in such property or any 
other property, no reference, explicit or implied, to dower 
or a widow's distributive share in her husband's real 
property, no reference, explicit or implied, to inheritance 
taxes. Taxation is the only context in which this provi-
sion could be meaningful, since under either petitioner's 
interpretation or respondent's interpretation of the docu-
ment, she is entitled to inherit the full property after 
taxes. This was Mr. Paxman's evident and primary con-
cern. The language above quoted is simply a general 
bequest by the husband to the wife of all of his property, 
both realty and personalty, and is couched in extremely 
hroad terms. To hold that this meets the statutory test, 
that it appears from this language that the husband in-
te11ded his bequest to be in addition to the widow's statu-
tory distributive share would require the same holding 
in relation to just about every broadly-phrased bequest or 
.11ra11t in a husband's will in favor of his wife. We submit 
1hat this result would be greatly at odds with the manifest 
leg·i~·dati,·e intent, and that a clear provision evidencing 
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specific intent in the will would be required if the hellC-
fit here sought is obtained - not just a general expression 
suggesting that the testator wanted his wife to have a8 
much of his propert!· as possible under the most favorable 
terms. 
vVe submit, therefore, that this will does not provide· 
that its legacy should be in addition to the widow's statu-
tory interest - indeed, it makes no reference or infer-
enc·e whatsoever to such interest. Therefore, it must be 
interpreted under the language of Section 7 4-4-4 to be in 
lieu of and not in addition to the statutory grant, and 
au election of one or the other by the wife is mandatory. 
Insofar as the lo\ver court held that the will shows the 
testator's intent that this bequest be in addition to Mrs. 
Paxman 's statutory one-third interest in the husband's 
realty, or that it was possible in this case for the widow 
to elect to take both her statutory interest and her legacy, 
we submit the lower court was in error and should he 
reversed. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN CON-
CLUDING THAT THE APPLICABLE TAX 
RATE TO BE APPLIED AGAINST THE 
TAXABLE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT, 
vVILLIAM PAXMAN, WAS 5% RATHER 
THAN 3%. 
Section 59-12-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides as follows: 
A tax equal to the sum of the following per-
centages of the market value of the net estate shall 
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be imposed upon the transfer of the net estate of 
every decedent, whether a resident or nonresident 
of this state: 
Three per cent of the amount bv which the net 
estate exceeds $10,000 and not to exceed $25,000, 
0xcept where property not exceeding in value the 
8Um of $40,000 goes to the husband, wife and/or 
children of the deceased or anv or all of them by . . 
descent, devise, bequest or transfer directly or 
through a trustee, then in such case the exemp-
tions shall be the amount so going not to exceed 
$40,000; 
Five per cent of the amount by which the net 
estate exceeds $25,000 and does not exceed $75,000 
except where property not exceeding in value the 
sum of $40,000 goes to the husband, wife and/or 
children of the deceased or any of or all of them 
by descent, devise, bequest or transfer directly 
or through a trustee, then in such case the exemp-
tion shall be the amount so going not to exceed 
$40,000, but on the excess of $40,000 the rate shall 
he as herein provided; 
Eight per cent of the amount by which the net 
estate exceeds $75,000 and does not exceed 
$125,000; 
rren per cent of the amount by which the net 
estate exceeds $125,000; provided, at the discre-
tion of the tax commission, the taxpayer may 
f'hoose to pay in kind on an estate or any portion 
thereof which is not liquid. 
'L1he inheritance tax provided for in this section is a 
.~raduated tax, with rates varying according to the size 
of tli0 net estate. The net estate is determined hy mak-
ing- c·ertain specified deductions (debts, property pre-
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viously taxed, tax-free bequests) from the gross estate, 
as provided by Section 59-12-7, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. The gross estate, in turn, is computed according 
to certain criteria set forth in Section 59-12-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. 
The initial tax rate provided for in Section 59-12-2 
is 3%, and is imposed on that part of the net estate be-
tween $10,000 and $25,000 in value. The next bracket, 
with a 5% rate, is on that part of a net estate between 
$25,000 and $75,000 in value. There is no tax on the first 
$10,000 value in any estate; this figure is the basic and 
universal exemption. Note, however, that there is pro-
vision for a $40,000 exemption in certain circumstances 
(where the property in question "goes to the husband, 
wife and/or children of the deceased or any or all of 
them by descent, devise, bequest or transfer directly or 
through a trustee") a;nd that th is $40,000 exemption is 
not deducted prior to computing the net or taxable es-
tate, but that the $40,000 amount simply eats up the tax 
bracket as set forth in the statute. Since $40,000 is 
greater than $25,000, this exemption, where appropriate, 
eliminates from tax the entire 3 % bracket and half of the 
5% bracket. It follows that whenever the $40,000 exemp-
tion is appropriate, the initial tax rate is 5% rather 
than 3%. 
This conclusion is supported by the expression "but 
on the excess of $40,000 the rate shall be as herein pro-
vided" at the end of the paragraph providing the 5% 
rate. This is an express statutory statement that the 
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G7o rate shall apply to that part of the estate between 
$40,000 and $75,000 in value. 
'I'hat this is to be interpreted in the context of this 
paragraph alone is certainly evident, since a clause of 
this type appears in this paragraph alone, and no similar 
language may be found in the paragraphs providing for 
the 3%, 8% or 10% tax brackets. This is reasonable, 
siHce the 5% bracket is the only bracket requiring ad-
justment where a $40,000 exemption is claimed. Indeed, 
t hi' re is no other explanation which would justify the 
in!'lusion of this language at this precise point in the 
statute. 
Any doubt that the legislative intent behind this 
section is as submitted above must be eliminated by 
a consideration of In Re Wal ton's Estate, 115 Utah 160, 
203 P. 2d 393 (1949). The Walton case considered a 
number of questions in relation to the interpretation of 
Sertion 59-12-2. Most of them are not relevant to the in-
stant problem; one of them, however, is. In discussing 
the exemption appropriate to the Walton estate, and what 
effect such exemptions would have on the sections herein 
clrscribed, the court said: 
The first sentence of the second paragraph of 
Section 80-12-2, as amended, imposes 3% tax on 
that part of the net estate that exceeds $10,000 and 
does not exceed $25,000. But, the paragraph con-
tinues, if the property goes to certain specified 
people - "husband, ·wife and/or children" the 
"exemptions" are as high as $40,000 if that 
amount of property so passes. 
It seems clear that as the first tax to be im-
posed upon any part of an estate is the 3% of that 
25 
over $10,000 and not to exceed $25,000, there is at 
least $10,000 exempt in all cases. Starting with 
this premise, it is reasonable to say that what the 
legislature had in mind was: In case of the speci-
fied heirs, they have an exemption as high as 
$40,000 if the property going to them equals that 
amount. Assuming a net estate of $24,000, if thr 
property going to them is only $100, the general 
exemption of $10,000 applies and the 37o tax iR 
on all above that $10,000. If the property going 
to them is $15,000, a 3 % tax is payable upon the 
difference between the $15,000 and the $24,000. 
If in a larger estate the property going to them is 
$26,000 there is no 3% tax due, but the 5% tax is 
payable upon the property in excess of $26,000 an<l 
not exceeding $75,000. If they receive property of 
$41,000 valuation, $40,000 is exernpt and 5% pay-
able on all in excess of $40,000 but not exceeding 
$75,000. (Emphasis supplied.) 
A concurring opinion in this case by the esteemed for-
mer Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, James H. Wolfe, 
is perhaps even more explicit. He wrote '' ... if the prop-
erty passing to the heirs designated by the statute ex-
ceeded $40,000, up to the amount of $75,000, the tax on 
the $35,000 or any part thereof would be as provided on 
the general scale of $25,000 to $75,000 or 5%." He then 
illustrated the mathematical ramifications of the bracket 
system in chart form. 
The Tax Commission in its interpretation of Section 
59-12-2 has for many decades been consistent with thr 
Walt on case and the procedure and concepts set forth 
herein, whenever a $40,000 exemption is claimed in all 
estate totaling more than $40,000 in value; since the \Va 1-
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tou case, this procedure has not been challenged, in so 
far as this office has been able to determine, and it has 
certainly never been successfully challenged. 
The comments and arguments set forth earlier in 
this brief about the force and effect of a long standing 
ndminiRtrative practice and interpretation apply with 
equal force here as in Point I. The same is true in rela-
tion to the duty of a taxpayer asserting an exemption to 
prove that he is entitled thereto, and the presumption 
existing against exemption in favor of the taxing author-
ity, which have also been previously discussed. 
In way of illustration, it may be of value to the court 
to set forth representative computations under Section 
59-12-2. We will presume a net estate valued at $100,000. 
The first computation illustrates the tax that would be 
properly imposed if only the $10,000 exemption were 
appropriate: 
$ 0 - $ 10,000 ________________________________ Exempt 
$10,000 - $ 25,000 at 3% ------------------------ $450 
$25,000 - $ 75,000 at 5% ------------------------$2500 
$75,000 - $100,000 at 8% ________________________ $2000 
Total Tax ______________________________________ $4950 
This second computation shows tax due when the es-
tate is eligible for the $40,000 exemption: 
$ 0 - $ 10,000 ________________________________ Exempt 
$10,000 - $ 25,000 ________________________________ Exempt 
$25,000 - $ 40,000 ________________________________ Exempt 
$40,000 - $ 75,000 at 5% ________________________ $1750 
$7f5,000 - $100,000 at 8% ________________________ $2000 
Total Tax ------------------------------------$3750 
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Thus, the Legislature created a real benefit and conceR 
sion in favor of those who leave their property, consistent 
with statutory directive, to their spouses and children. 
On the sample estate above set forth a $1200 tax saving 
is effected - should the decedent leave all of his property 
to others than his immediate family, an inheritance tax of 
$4950 would be due instead of a tax of only $3750, which 
would be appropriate had family members been his heirs. 
Counsel for petitioner contended in a memorandum sub-
mitted to the lower court that the Tax Commission's and 
Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 59-12-2 in the 
Walton case would ''put the direct heirs of the decedent 
in a disadvantageous position compared with collateral 
heirs" and favor "collateral heirs or strangers" over 
"surviving spouses or children." The fallacy of thi~ 
contention is clearly demonstrated by the computations 
set forth above. 
It is clear, of course, that if the position of counsel 
for the executrix is sustained in face of the Walt on de-
cision, the Tax Commission's long standing interpreta-
tion, and the decision of the lower court on this point, an 
even greater benefit would accrue to the spouses and 
children involved. The appropriate computation in this 
case would be as follows: 
$ 0 - $ 10,000 --------------------------------Exempt 
$10,000 - $ 25,000 --------------------------------Exempt 
$25,000 - $ 40,000 --------------------------------Exempt 
$40,000 - $ 55,000 at 3 % ........................ $45ll 
$55,000 - $100,000 at 5% ··········-·-···········$2250 
Total Tax ·-------······-··-····················$2700 
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It is respectfully submitted, however, that the Leg-
islature clearly never intended that the computation 
should be made in this manner, and that such a eomputa-
t ion vwuld be at odds with both the spirit and the ex-
prPss \\'Ording of Section 59-12-2, Utah Code Annotated, 
1 !Jfi3. 
CONCLUSION 
Sections 74-4-3 and 74-4-4, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, require, unless the husband's will clearly designates 
to the contrary, that an election be made by the widow to 
take either under the terms of the will or acc.ept her 
8tatutory distributive share. The will in the instant case 
does not so designate, and the State Tax Commission 
respectfully urges reversal of that part of the lower 
court's decision which states or implies that the will does 
t>o provide, or that the widow is entitled to take both under 
the statute and the will .. It is prayed that that part of 
the court's decision dealing with inheritance tax rates, 
from which a cross-appeal has been taken by respondent 
in this case, be affirmed. It is further submitted that 
there are compelling and controlling case precedents 
wliich support both of these points in this jurisdiction, 
and that the best interests of the state of Utah and its 
ritizens would be served by re-affirming the conclusions 
nnd principles set forth in these cases. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Appella;nt 
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